Beyond negotiated outcomes: The hidden costs of anger expression in dyadic negotiation

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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the hidden costs of expressing anger in negotiations. Two experimental studies show that an opponent's expression of anger can elicit both concessionary and retaliatory responses by focal negotiators. In the first study, equal-power negotiators exhibited overt concessionary behaviors when their opponents expressed anger, but also sabotaged their opponents covertly. Feelings of mistreatment mediated the relationship between opponents' anger expression and focal negotiators' covert retaliation. In the second study, low-power negotiators made larger concessions when high-power opponents expressed anger, but they retaliated covertly against high-power negotiators. High-power negotiators were overtly demanding (and not concessionary) regardless of whether or not the opponent expressed anger, but also retaliated covertly against low-power opponents who expressed anger. The two studies suggest that the value-claiming advantages of expressed anger need to be weighed against the costs of eliciting (covert) retaliation. We discuss implications of the findings and provide recommendations for future research.

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Introduction

Anger frequently arises when individuals negotiate conflicting interests (Allred, 1999; Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Barry, 1999; Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Thomas, 1992). Despite a widespread belief that negotiators should refrain from expressing anger (Adler, Rosen, & Silverstein, 1998; Nierenberg, 1991), research has consistently documented the benefits to negotiators of expressing anger (e.g., Adam, Shirako, & Maddux, 2010; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004a, 2004b). For example, negotiators who express anger tend to receive larger concessions (Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). The strategic advantages to expressing one's anger at the negotiating table are therefore substantial (for a review, see Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). This literature notes that individuals care not only about the agreement that is reached, but also about the fairness of their treatment in the process (Ferguson et al., 2008). When fairness is violated, individuals often engage in retaliatory behavior, which research in the workplace aggression literature shows can be overt or covert (Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Mitchell & Ambrose, 2007; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Given that opportunities for such covert retaliation are also available in the context of negotiation, the studies described here investigate negotiators' responses to expressions of anger beyond concessions at the negotiating table in order to gain a more complete understanding of the consequences of expressing anger in negotiations.

This paper examines the hidden costs of expressing anger in negotiations. Two experimental studies show that an opponent's expression of anger can elicit both concessionary and retaliatory responses by focal negotiators. The first study, equal-power negotiators exhibited overt concessionary behaviors when their opponents expressed anger, but also sabotaged their opponents covertly. Feelings of mistreatment mediated the relationship between opponents' anger expression and focal negotiators' covert retaliation. In the second study, low-power negotiators made larger concessions when high-power opponents expressed anger, but they retaliated covertly against high-power negotiators. High-power negotiators were overtly demanding (and not concessionary) regardless of whether or not the opponent expressed anger, but also retaliated covertly against low-power opponents who expressed anger. The two studies suggest that the value-claiming advantages of expressed anger need to be weighed against the costs of eliciting (covert) retaliation. We discuss implications of the findings and provide recommendations for future research.
Overt and covert effects of anger expression

The expression of emotions such as anger not only influences individuals who express the emotion (Allred et al., 1997) but also those who observe the emotion (Morris & Keltner, 2000). The Emotion as Social Information (EASI) model suggests that expression of emotions through nonverbal (facial expression, body posture, or tone of voice) and/or verbal (language) channels can influence an observer through both an inferential and an affective mechanism (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef, Van Doorn, Heerding, & Koning, 2011).

Inferential influence occurs when individuals actively interpret others’ expressions for meaning (Darwin, 1872; Frank, 1988; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, 2009). Emotion-based inferences then inform and shape the observers’ subsequent attitudes and behaviors. For example, an individual’s expression of emotion may influence an observer’s perception of the expresser’s attitude and intention, which may then influence the observer’s subsequent behaviors. The importance of the inferential mechanism in determining the interpersonal effects of anger expression in negotiation is well established: An opponent’s expression of anger at the negotiating table is interpreted as signaling toughness, dissatisfaction with the current offer, unwillingness to make further concessions, and threat of an impasse (Pietroni, Van Kleef, de Dreu, & Padiglialo, 2008; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2008; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). Such inferences lead negotiators to offer concessions to avoid a costly impasse (Sinaceur, Van Kleef, Neale, Adam, & Haag, 2011). These findings are consistent with the rational-choice arguments that negotiators are strategic actors who detect and decipher opponents’ emotional expressions and act on that information to maximize their interests (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010).

The affective mechanism of reactions to expressed emotions in negotiation is developed through findings that emotional expressions also elicit affective reactions in observers (Barsade, 2002; Elfenbein, 2008; Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Van Kleef, 2009), which may then influence observers’ subsequent behaviors. For example, an individual’s emotional expression may influence how an observer feels (affective reaction), which may then influence an observer’s subsequent behavior. The importance of the inferential mechanism in determining the interpersonal effects of anger expression in negotiation is well established: An opponent’s expression of anger at the negotiating table is interpreted as signaling toughness, dissatisfaction with the current offer, unwillingness to make further concessions, and threat of an impasse (Pietroni, Van Kleef, de Dreu, & Padiglialo, 2008; Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2008; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b). Such inferences lead negotiators to offer concessions to avoid a costly impasse (Sinaceur, Van Kleef, Neale, Adam, & Haag, 2011). These findings are consistent with the rational-choice arguments that negotiators are strategic actors who detect and decipher opponents’ emotional expressions and act on that information to maximize their interests (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2010).

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Whereas evidence consistently suggests that one negotiator’s expressed anger often results in a negative emotional reaction in the other negotiator (Friedman et al., 2004; Kopelman, Rosette, & Chervany, 1998; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996), the impact of this affective mechanism in negotiations is not well understood. Some studies have shown that negotiators induced to experience high levels of negative feelings towards each other become significantly less cooperative at the negotiation table (e.g., Allred et al., 1997; Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). For example, individuals who felt disrespected due to a small offer in an ultimatum game were more likely to reject the offer to spite the other party (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). This is consistent with research suggesting that negative emotional experiences, especially feelings of disrespect and mistreatment, are often associated with aggressive and retaliatory behaviors (Barclay et al., 2005; Bies & Tripp, 1996; Dollard, Miller, Doob, & Mowrer, 1939; Frijda, 1986; Greenberg, 1990; Thomas & Pondy, 1977; Tripp & Bies, 1997). However, more recent studies have demonstrated that negotiators offer greater concessions to an angry opponent at the negotiation table, despite experiencing negative emotions themselves (Van Kleef et al., 2004a).

Hypothesis 1. An opponent’s expression of anger increases a focal negotiator’s concessionary behaviors during the negotiation.

Making concessions at the negotiation table does not mean that a negotiator will not pursue other means to get back at an opponent who expresses anger. This idea is supported by research showing that most aggressive acts in organizations occur in covert forms (Neuman & Baron, 1998) – that is, doing harm to a target anonymously or even without the target’s knowledge (Baron & Neuman, 1996) – because covert aggression entails less risk. Similarly, the organizational justice literature highlights that individuals who feel mistreated by others often find covert ways to retaliate (such as spreading damaging gossip, exerting less effort in completing a task, or withholding voluntary actions or resources that would benefit an individual) when overt confrontation is risky (e.g., Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). For example, Greenberg (1993) showed that individuals sought revenge by secretly stealing items that had no value to them from others who had treated them unfairly. Negotiations present covert (and hence less risky) opportunities for retaliating against an angry opponent (Allred, 1999). For example, a negotiator may secretly withhold important resources that would be beneficial to the opponent’s career success, or disparage the opponent’s reputation to sabotage the opponent’s future opportunities (Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008). Extending the outcomes of negotiation beyond negotiated outcomes, we predict that negotiators are likely to covertly retaliate against angry opponents.

Hypothesis 2. An opponent’s expression of anger increases a focal negotiator’s covert retaliation.

We further suggest that the effect of expressions of anger on negotiators’ covert retaliation is mediated by negotiators’ negative affective experience. The affective mechanism of the EASI model (Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2011) predicts that opponents’ expressions of anger influence focal negotiators’ affective states. Specifically, anger expression is likely to elicit negative feelings of mistreatment in negotiators. When people feel mistreated, they often feel the urge to get back at the perpetrator (Barclay et al., 2005; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, 2001; Rupp & Spencer, 2006) because mistreatment stimulates a desire to reciprocate harm with harm (Berkowitz, 1993). However, to avoid the risks of overt
negotiation, negotiators are likely to resist overt retaliation against their opponents in favor of covert means.

Hypothesis 3. Feelings of mistreatment mediate the influence of opponents’ anger expression on focal negotiators’ covert retaliatory behavior.

Together, the above hypotheses suggest that expressing anger in negotiation can elicit both positive and negative outcomes. Although anger expression could induce overt concessions as predicted by the inferential mechanism of the EASI model, it could also invite covert retaliation as predicted by the affective mechanism of the model. Moreover, covert retaliation should be fueled by negotiators’ feelings of mistreatment resulting from their opponents’ expression of anger. These hypotheses were tested in two experimental studies. In Study 1, we examined whether negotiators would retaliate covertly while overtly acting in a conciliatory manner in response to an opponent’s expression of anger. In Study 2, we varied negotiators’ power and investigated whether covert retaliation would still occur when negotiators do not engage in concessionary behavior during a negotiation in response to expressed anger.

Study 1: Overt and covert reactions to an angry opponent

Method

Participants and design

Sixty-one students from a large university were compensated $20 to participate. Of these participants, 23 were female and the average age was 21 years. Study 1 featured two between-subjects conditions: (1) an angry opponent condition, in which a participant negotiated with a confederate who expressed anger during the negotiation (n = 30); and (2) a neutral opponent condition, in which a participant negotiated with a confederate who expressed no emotion during the negotiation (n = 31). Participants were randomly assigned to conditions.

Manipulations

A professional actor (confederate) played the role of the opponent in all negotiations. The actor was a white male who was blind to the hypotheses of the research. In both conditions, the actor followed a script verbatim during the negotiation (a copy of the script is shown in Appendix A). Emotion expression was manipulated through nonverbal channels exclusively. For example, in the angry opponent condition, the actor displayed a number of nonverbal cues consistent with anger expression, such as frowning, clenching his jaw, raising his voice, and rising up and leaning forward slightly when making offers. In the neutral opponent condition, the actor maintained an emotionless demeanor throughout the negotiation by displaying a neutral facial expression, speaking in a monotonic voice, and sitting in a relaxed but professional posture. The actor used the same techniques to convey anger or no emotion regardless of the participant’s responses.

Procedure and negotiation task

Participants arrived at the experiment one at a time. Upon arrival, the participant and the confederate were seated across a table from each other. The experimenter explained that two unrelated studies would be conducted. The first study would require the two individuals to engage in a negotiation and the second study would require them to perform tasks individually in separate rooms. After the initial introduction to the experiment, the participant received instructions for the negotiation task. The negotiation task was a fixed-sum negotiation between a seller and a buyer regarding a contract to procure mobile phones (see Van Kleef et al., 2004a). Specifically, the participant negotiated on behalf of a potential seller for a new model of mobile phone, while the buyer was played by the confederate. There were three issues in the negotiation: price of the cell phones, warranty period, and service contract. Each issue had nine agreement options with different payoffs for the buyer and seller. Participants were provided with a payoff table that described all the possible ways negotiators could settle the negotiation and the points they would receive for each alternative settlement. Before the start of the negotiation, participants answered a set of questions to ensure that they clearly understood the negotiation instructions. To those who made mistakes, the experimenter explained the negotiation procedure again.

When the negotiation started, the experimenter would leave the room and the confederate would make the first offer. Participants were deliberately not told how long the negotiation would last. The negotiation was terminated either when an agreement was reached before round six of the negotiation or after the participant made an offer at round six (see Van Kleef et al., 2004a). After the confederate left the room, ostensibly for the second study, the participant filled out a questionnaire about his/her negotiation experience. After completing the questionnaire, the participant was introduced to what had earlier been described to them as the “second study”. A new set of instructions with consent information was presented to the participant in an envelope. The instructions for the study explained that the participant and the confederate were each to perform two tasks individually in separate rooms. Participants would first assign two tasks to the confederate and two to themselves. After completing the task assignment decision, participants were told that they did not have to complete their tasks. Finally, participants were fully debriefed and paid before leaving.

Measures

Manipulation check. Two questions assessed whether the confederate expressed anger during the negotiation (“The buyer expressed anger during the negotiation”): “The buyer expressed irritation during the negotiation”) using 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = totally disagree and 7 = totally agree; x = .83).

Feelings of mistreatment. Participants’ feelings of mistreatment were measured using an interactional justice measure (Bies & Moag, 1986). The scale consisted of four items (“The buyer treated me with dignity during the negotiation”; “The buyer treated me in a polite manner during the negotiation”; “The buyer refrained from improper behaviors and expressions during the negotiation”; “The buyer treated me with respect during the negotiation”), which were scored on 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = totally disagree and 7 = totally agree; x = .94). The scale was reversed to reflect feelings of mistreatment, such that a higher score on this measure indicated greater mistreatment.

Overt response: Negotiation outcome. Two different negotiation outcomes (participants’ agreement and final offer) were used to represent participants’ overt response. If an agreement was reached before the sixth round of the negotiation, agreement was coded 1 and otherwise coded 0. Participants’ final offer regardless of agreement was converted into points based on the payoff table provided to participants.

Covert retaliation: Task assignment. After the negotiation, participants were presented with short descriptions of four tasks (shown in Appendix B) and indicated the extent to which they would like their opponent to perform each of the four tasks on a 7-point Likert-type scale, (1 = not at all and 7 = very much). Participants were reminded that this study was unrelated to the negotiation study. Pretests showed that two of the tasks were deemed by participants in this population to be highly attractive and appealing
(Task 1 and Task 3) and two were deemed to be highly unattractive and unappealing (Task 2 and Task 4). Responses regarding the two positive tasks were reverse-coded and averaged to create the covert retaliation measure. A high score on this measure indicated that participants retaliated against the confederate by assigning the confederate unappealing tasks and by denying the confederate appealing tasks. This measure reflects covert retaliation because participants were informed that their opponents would not know who had made the decision about the task assignments. Therefore, participants’ identity remained anonymous.

**Results**

**Manipulation check**

As expected, participants perceived the confederate as expressing significantly more anger in the angry opponent condition ($M = 4.57$, $SD = 1.76$) than in the neutral opponent condition ($M = 2.37$, $SD = 1.30$), $t(59) = 5.55$, $p < .001$.

**Negotiated outcome**

Hypothesis 1 predicted that negotiators would engage in more concessionary behavior during the negotiation when their opponent expressed anger. Although the confederate was demanding in the first six rounds of the negotiation, a significantly higher proportion of participants reached agreement with the confederate when the confederate expressed angry ($43\%$) than when the confederate’s expression was neutral ($19\%$), $\chi^2(1, N = 61) = 4.09$, $p < .05$. Thus, consistent with Hypothesis 1, anger expression was effective in eliciting overt concessionary behavior at the negotiation table. Similarly, participants demanded (final offer) less in the angry expression condition ($M = 344.17$, $SD = 96.24$) than in the neutral expression condition ($M = 374.35$, $SD = 105.78$), although the difference did not reach statistical significance, $t(59) = 1.17$, $ns$. These findings replicate previous research demonstrating that expressing anger may be an effective strategy to elicit concessions in a negotiation (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b).

**Covert retaliation**

Hypothesis 2 predicted that an opponent’s anger expression would increase a focal negotiator’s covert retaliation. Participants were significantly more likely to engage in covert retaliation in the angry opponent condition ($M = 3.51$, $SD = 1.66$) than in the neutral opponent condition ($M = 2.35$, $SD = 1.12$), $t(59) = -3.22$, $p < .01$. There was no significant difference in participants’ task choice for themselves across the two conditions. Regression analysis confirmed that this effect persisted when controlling for negotiation agreement and participants’ final offer ($\beta = .35$, $p < .01$). Hypothesis 2 is thus supported. Together, the above analyses show that anger expression elicits overt concessions but covert retaliation – in this case, in the form of withholding positive outcomes and imposing negative outcomes (i.e., punishment) – in negotiations between equal-power parties.

**Feelings of mistreatment**

Hypothesis 3 predicted that feelings of mistreatment would mediate the relationship between the opponent’s anger expression and negotiators’ covert retaliation. Consistent with mediation, participants reported feeling significantly more mistreated in the angry opponent condition ($M = 4.35$, $SD = 1.81$) than in the neutral opponent condition ($M = 2.10$, $SD = 1.07$), $t(46.86) = 5.90$, $p < .001$, even when controlling for negotiation agreement and participants’ final offer ($\beta = .65$, $p < .001$). When controlling for the significant effect of participants’ feelings of mistreatment on participants’ covert retaliation ($\beta = .30$, $p < .05$), expression of anger no longer significantly predicted retaliation ($\beta = .28$, $ns$). The significance of this mediation effect was confirmed with a follow-up Sobel test, $Z = 2.26$, $p < .05$. Thus, in line with Hypothesis 3, feelings of mistreatment mediated the effect of anger expression on covert retaliation.

**Discussion**

The goal of Study 1 was to investigate whether negotiators would retaliate covertly while overtly acting in a concessionary manner in response to an opponent who expressed anger. Extending previous research on the benefits of anger expressions in negotiations (see Van Kleef et al., 2008), an opponent’s expression of anger influenced both a negotiator’s overt concessions and a negotiator’s covert retaliation towards the opponent. Overtly, negotiators were more likely to reach agreement when their opponents expressed anger. However, the same negotiators were also more likely to covertly retaliate against their opponents who expressed anger. Consistent with previous findings on the overt effects of anger expressed verbally and nonverbally (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006) and through text messages (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2004a), Study 1 lends further support for the strategic value of anger expression: anger expressed nonverbally was effective in helping the expresser gain concessions from opponents.

However, Study 1 also offers a strong caution concerning the expression of anger in the negotiation process. Specifically, while negotiators were more likely to offer concessions to an opponent who expressed anger, these negotiators also denied gratifying opportunities and imposed significant obstacles for their opponent after the negotiation. Therefore, Study 1 extends previous research on the costs of anger expression in conflict settings by showing that anger expression not only decreases negotiators’ willingness to negotiate with angry opponents in the future (Kopelman et al., 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004b) but also leads to retaliatory behavior intended to harm angry opponents.

Moreover, mediation analysis showed that feelings of mistreatment mediated the effect of opponents’ expression of anger on focal negotiators’ covert retaliation. That is, negotiators sabotaged those who expressed anger because they felt offended by the anger. This finding supports the dual influence of the inferential and affective mechanisms proposed by the Emotion as Social Information (EASI) model (Van Kleef, 2009). Whereas previous research has confirmed that negotiators use opponents’ anger expression as information to gauge how they should behave when claiming value (Van Kleef et al., 2010), results reported in Study 1 suggest that negotiators’ affective experience is also influenced by opponents’ anger expression, and that this affective experience increases negotiators’ covert retaliatory behavior.

It is important, however, to point out that those negotiators in Study 1 who retaliated covertly also made larger concessions overtly. This raises the possibility that covert retaliation was inspired by the concessions made during the negotiation. That is, negotiators may have sabotaged their opponents covertly because of perceived value-loss during the negotiation. Although negotiation outcomes (negotiators’ agreement and final offer) were statistically controlled while examining negotiators’ covert retaliatory behavior, it seems important to demonstrate that covert retaliation would still occur even when negotiators do not concede in response to expressions of anger during the negotiation. To disentangle overt concession making from covert retaliation, Study 2 examined the effects of anger expression on covert retaliation by considering the role of power.

**Study 2: Covert retaliation without overt concession: The role of power**

Power in negotiations can be understood as the degree of perceived dependence between the negotiators (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981). Negotiators with lower power tend to lack favorable
alternatives to an agreement and therefore they are more dependent on their opponents to reach a favorable outcome (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994). This makes it risky for them to adopt a demanding stance during the negotiation, because the opponent might reject their demands and thereby hurt their outcomes. In contrast, negotiators with higher power have more favorable alternatives they can turn to in case of an impasse (Pinkley et al., 1994). As a result, it is less risky for them to take a competitive stance during the negotiation.

Significant inroads have been made in understanding how power influences negotiators’ value claiming response to opponents’ expressions of anger (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007). In particular, given the lack of desirable alternatives to a negotiated agreement, low-power negotiators are more likely to appease their angry opponents by making larger concessions during the negotiation (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004b). On the other hand, since high-power negotiators are less dependent on their low-power opponents, there is less pressure for them to concede to the demands of their opponents even when anger is expressed. Indeed, past research shows that high-power negotiators can be immune to opponents’ expressions of anger – high-power negotiators demand a significant amount of value regardless of whether low-power negotiators express anger or not (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004b). Therefore, we offer the following replication hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 4.** Power moderates focal negotiators’ overt response to an opponent’s expression of anger. An opponent’s expression of anger increases a low-power negotiator’s concessionary behavior more than it increases a high-power negotiator’s concessionary behavior.

As indicated in Fig. 1, power should moderate negotiators’ overt responses to anger expression because power determines how risky it is to overtly adopt a demanding stance. An overtly demanding stance can be a risky strategy for a low-power negotiator because a demanding stance risks impasse, and consequently risks being saddled with unattractive alternatives. To avoid impasse, low-power negotiators are motivated to adopt a concessionary stance to appease their angry opponents. In contrast, because high-power negotiators have attractive alternatives to a negotiated agreement, it is less costly for them to reach an impasse, and therefore it is less risky to adopt a competitive stance.

**Hypothesis 5.** Perceived risk mediates the moderating impact of power on negotiators’ overt response to opponents’ anger expression such that low-power negotiators are less demanding of an angry opponent than high-power negotiators because of the higher perceived risk of being demanding.

Although negotiators may claim different amounts of value depending on their power, they may retaliate against angry opponents covertly regardless of their power. Despite acting in a concessionary manner overtly, low-power negotiators may feel offended by their high-power opponents’ anger expression (Hsee, Hatfield, Carlson, & Chemtob, 1990). More importantly, their affect-driven retaliation is likely to surface covertly, when retaliating is less risky. Indeed, research on power suggests low-power individuals often only comply with high-power individuals to the extent that they believe the high-power individuals can observe their behavior and bring punishment (French & Raven, 1959). When there are opportunities for low-power negotiators to strike anonymously, they should be able to behave more freely based on how they feel. Therefore, we expect low-power negotiators to strike back covertly against their high-power opponents who express anger.

On the other hand, although high-power negotiators are free to claim as much value as possible overtly, without the risk of reaching an impasse, they should feel equally offended by their low-power opponents’ expression of anger. Recent research shows that negotiators’ affective experience is not always tightly coupled with objective performance outcomes (Curhan et al., 2009). Rather, how negotiators feel may be significantly influenced by the emotional dynamics of the negotiation process, such as the emotion expressed by the opponent. Organizational justice research points out that when individuals are treated without interpersonal sensitivity, they report feeling injustice even when they received a fair outcome (Greenberg, 1993). Therefore, despite adopting a demanding stance overtly (regardless of whether they expressed anger), we expect high-power negotiators to feel offended by their low-power opponents’ anger expression, which should fuel their desire to get back at their opponents covertly.

**Hypothesis 6.** Opponent’s expression of anger increases both low-power and high-power negotiators’ covert retaliation.

**Method**

**Participants and design**

A total of 100 students from a large university participated, and each was compensated $20. Of these participants, 57 were female and the average age was 22 years. The experiment featured a 2 (angry opponent vs. neutral opponent) × 2 (high-power participant vs. low-power participant) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to conditions.

**Manipulations**

A professional voice actor (confederate) played the role of the opponent in all conditions. Similar to Study 1, emotion expression was manipulated through nonverbal channels exclusively. The actor was blind to the hypotheses of the study and received training in displaying anger and neutral emotion using only voice, facial expressions, and body postures. A professional voice actor was used because Study 1 suggested that tone of voice was an important medium for communicating anger in this context. Although negotiations took place face-to-face, participants in this sample often avoided looking directly at their opponents during the negotiation. Therefore, tone of voice was the primary channel of expression influencing participants’ perception of the actor’s emotion. In both conditions, the actor followed an adapted version of the script used in Study 1 verbatim.

Following previous research (e.g., Pinkley et al., 1994), participants’ power was manipulated by varying their BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Outcome). In all conditions, participants played the role of a seller of a new model of mobile phones, and negotiated for points according to a payoff table given to them at the beginning of the experiment. Participants in the low-power conditions would receive no points if they could not reach an agreement, whereas participants in the high-power conditions would receive a set amount of points regardless of whether they reached an agreement or not.
agreement with their opponents. Their opponents, however, could still earn some points by opting to buy the phones from another seller. Participants in the high-power conditions could opt for an alternative offer for the phones worth 510 points (more than 65 percent of the total value to be claimed in the negotiation). In contrast, their low-power opponents would receive zero points if no agreement was reached.

Procedure and negotiation task
A research assistant blind to the hypotheses followed a script when running the experiment. The procedure and negotiation tasks were the same as those used in Study 1, with two additions: first, it was emphasized that participants must strive to earn as many points as they could during the negotiation; second, participants were informed that the points they earned in the negotiation could increase their chances of winning additional money (a lottery prize worth $30). Both instructions were designed to compel participants to take the negotiation seriously and to increase their motivation to maximize points. Similar to Study 1, participants received an envelope containing instructions for the “second study” (the retaliation measure). After completing the retaliation measure, participants were fully debriefed before leaving.

Measures
Manipulation check for opponent’s anger expression. The same two questions used in Study 1 assessed the confederate’s anger expression during the negotiation (x = .81).

Manipulation check for power. Before the negotiation, participants indicated whether they felt more or less powerful than the confederate (“Between the seller and the buyer, who has a more powerful bargaining position?”) using a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = definitely buyer and 5 = definitely seller).

Perceived riskiness of adopting a demanding stance overtly. Perceived riskiness of adopting a demanding stance overtly was measured with three items (“It could be risky for me to get aggressive with the other negotiator during this negotiation”; “Acting angry or belligerent during this negotiation could be very costly to me”; “I have a lot to lose if I retaliated against the other negotiator during this negotiation”) using a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = totally disagree and 7 = totally agree) after the negotiation. The three items were combined into a single scale (x = .74).

Overt response: Negotiation outcome. Negotiation outcome was measured the same way as in Study 1.

Covert retaliation: Task assignment. Covert retaliation was measured the same way as in Study 1.

Results
Manipulation checks
A 2 (angry opponent vs. neutral opponent) × 2 (high-power negotiator vs. low-power negotiator) ANOVA on participants’ perceptions of the confederate’s anger showed a significant main effect for the confederate’s anger expression, F(1,96) = 123.52, p < .001. Participants perceived the confederate to be significantly more angry in the angry opponent condition (M = 5.70, SD = 1.43) than in the neutral opponent condition (M = 2.64, SD = 1.30). No other significant effects were found. A 2 (angry opponent vs. neutral opponent) × 2 (high-power negotiator vs. low-power negotiator) ANOVA on power perception showed a significant main effect for power, F(1,96) = 1339.65, p < .001. Participants saw themselves as having significantly more power compared to the confederate in the high-power condition (M = 4.58, SD = .58) than in the low-power condition (M = 1.14, SD = .35). No other effects were significant.

Negotiated outcome
Agreement. Hypothesis 4 predicted that power would moderate negotiators’ value claiming behavior in response to opponents’ expression of anger such that an opponent’s expression of anger increases a low-power negotiator’s concessionary behavior more than it increases a high-power negotiator’s concessionary behavior. In the low-power conditions, a significantly higher proportion of participants chose to settle before the sixth round of the negotiation when the confederate expressed anger (64%) than when the confederate expressed no emotion (20%), χ²(1, N = 100) = 9.93, p < .01. Consistent with Study 1, low-power participants engaged in more concessionary behavior when their opponent expressed anger. In contrast, expressions of anger did not create more settlements in the high-power conditions. High-power participants were less likely to reach agreement before the sixth round of the negotiation than low-power participants, χ²(1, N = 100) = 13.31, p < .01, regardless of whether their opponent expressed anger (8%) or no emotion (12%). In addition, although participants were not explicitly given the option to terminate the negotiation before the sixth round, anger expression caused some high-power participants (12%) to refuse to continue the negotiation. In contrast, zero participants in the low-power conditions refused to negotiate, regardless of whether the confederate expressed anger or no emotion.

Demands. A 2 (angry opponent vs. neutral opponent) × 2 (high-power negotiator vs. low-power negotiator) ANCOVA on participants’ final offer (controlling for initial offer) revealed a significant main effect of power, F(1,95) = 35.09, p < .001, and a significant main effect of anger expression, F(1,95) = 6.00, p < .05. A significant interaction between opponent’s anger expression and participant’s power also emerged, F(1,95) = 8.34, p < .01. Consistent with our prediction, participants’ demand (final offer) at the negotiation table differed significantly depending on their relative power and their opponent’s anger expression. As shown in Fig. 2, low-power participants demanded significantly less value when their opponent expressed anger (M = 289.00, SD = 94.49) (38% of the total value) than when their opponent expressed neutral emotion (M = 394.20, SD = 117.75) (52% of the total value), t(48) = 3.48, p < .01. In contrast, although high-power participants demanded significantly more value (M = 505.80, SD = 135.16) (67% of the total value) than low-power participants (M = 341.60, SD = 118.27) (45% of the total value), t(98) = −6.47, high-power participants did not make larger concessions when their opponent expressed anger (M = 507.60, SD = 131.22) (67% of the total value) than when their opponent expressed no emotion (M = 504.00, SD = 141.67) (66% of the total value), t(48) = −.90, ns. Together, these results suggest that anger was effective in inducing concessions only when it was expressed by high-power negotiators. Expressions of anger by low-power
negotiators did not have significant impact on high-power negotiators’ outcomes. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is supported.

Perceived riskiness of adopting a demanding stance overtly

We have argued that power moderates the impact of anger expression on negotiators’ value claiming behavior because power influences negotiators’ perceived risk of adopting a demanding stance overtly. To assess whether the effects of power on participants’ value claiming behavior were mediated by the perceived risk of adopting a demanding stance overtly, we performed the following analyses. First, regression analysis showed a significant main effect of power on participants’ perceived risk, $\beta = -.61$, $p < .01$. Second, regression analysis showed a significant interaction effect between anger expression and power on participants’ demand (final offer), $\beta = .60$, $p < .05$. In addition, regression analysis also showed a significant interaction effect between anger expression and perceived risk on participants’ demand, $\beta = -.55$, $p < .05$. When controlling for the significant relationship between power and perceived risk ($r = -.61$, $p < .001$), however, the previously reported significant interaction between power and anger expression was no longer significant ($\beta = .44$, ns). Thus, the perceived risk of adopting a demanding stance overtly explains the moderating impact of power on how anger expression influenced a participant’s value claiming behavior. Hypothesis 5 is thus supported.

Covert retaliation

Hypothesis 6 predicted that both low-power and high-power negotiators would be more likely to retaliate covertly against an angry opponent than against a neutral opponent. A 2 (angry opponent vs. neutral opponent) × 2 (high-power participant vs. low-power participant) ANCOVA on participants’ covert retaliation (controlling for agreement and final offer) revealed a significant main effect of power, $F(1,94) = 6.29$, $p < .05$, and a significant main effect of anger expression, $F(1,94) = 9.75$, $p < .01$, but no significant interaction between anger expression and power. As shown in Fig. 3, participants engaged in significantly more covert retaliation in the angry opponent conditions ($M = 3.07$, $SD = 1.47$) than in the neutral opponent conditions ($M = 2.18$, $SD = .95$), $t(92) = -3.96$, $p < .001$. Moreover, expression of anger invited covert retaliation in both low-power and high-power conditions. Low-power participants were significantly more likely to retaliate against an angry opponent ($M = 2.87$, $SD = 1.37$) than against a neutral opponent after the negotiation ($M = 2.13$, $SD = .92$), $t(48) = -2.24$, $p < .05$. Therefore, similar to the results of Study 1, while expressions of anger led to increased overt concessions (by low-power participants), it also significantly increased their covert retaliation. High-power participants also were more likely to retaliate against an angry opponent covertly ($M = 3.30$, $SD = 1.53$) than against a neutral opponent ($M = 2.22$, $SD = 1.00$), $t(48) = -2.95$, $p < .01$. Despite claiming substantial value during the negotiation, high-power negotiators still covertly retaliated against opponents who expressed anger. Thus, Hypothesis 6 is supported.

Discussion

Study 2 again showed that there are significant costs associated with expressing anger in negotiations. Consistent with previous research (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007), power influenced negotiators’ value claiming behavior during negotiation. Low-power negotiators made significant concessions during the negotiation when their high-power opponents expressed anger – supporting the strategic benefit of anger expression. In contrast, high-power negotiators demanded a large portion of the value regardless of whether or not their low-power opponents expressed anger. Moreover, Study 2 demonstrated that power influenced negotiators’ value claiming behavior in response to opponents’ anger expression through perceived risk of adopting a demanding stance overtly. High-power negotiators demanded a significant amount of value through the negotiation (regardless of whether or not anger was expressed) because adopting such a demanding stance against their low-power opponents was perceived to be less risky. On the other hand, low-power negotiators were more likely to engage in concessionary behaviors overtly when anger was expressed because adopting a demanding stance overtly could be risky and cost them in the negotiation.

Despite different overt responses to opponents’ expression of anger, both low-power and high-power negotiators retaliated against angry opponents covertly. High-power negotiators have already demanded significant amounts of value during negotiation, so they do not need to retaliate at their opponents to compensate for value-loss. And yet Study 2 showed that high-power negotiators struck back as vigorously as did low-power negotiators after their opponent expressed anger. This finding supplements the mediation analysis in Study 1 and serves as additional evidence that the covert retaliation is driven by negative affective reactions, and not by value considerations.

Similar to equal-power negotiators (Study 1), low-power negotiators expressed overt concessionary behavior but engaged in covert retaliatory behavior when their high-power opponents expressed anger. Past research suggests that individuals with high power typically feel freer to express anger towards those with low power (Keltner et al., 2008). While expressing anger may appear to be an effective vehicle for high-power negotiators to get what they want (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef & Côté, 2007), findings from Study 2 indicate that expressing anger at the negotiation table can bring about significant costs regardless of whether the expresser has high or low power.

General discussion

Although getting what one wants at the negotiation table is important, the costs of expressing anger to get one’s way may be substantial. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether expressing anger in negotiations can have hidden costs beyond the immediate economic benefits. Two studies consistently confirmed that anger expression can have both positive and negative effects. Results of both studies replicated previous findings (e.g., Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a, 2004b) that expressing anger helps negotiators extract larger concessions from their opponents when the expressers have equal or more power in the negotiation. Therefore, if focusing solely on claiming value, expressing anger indeed appears to be helpful when negotiating with others who are lower or equal in power. However, expressing anger also entailed significant costs. Results showed that opponents’ expressions of anger significantly increased retaliation by
negotiators. More significantly, this retaliation occurred covertly, so that the anger expresser could not know the source. Hence, when considering the outcomes of negotiation beyond the distribution of resources, expressing anger can hurt the expresser if opportunities exist for opponents to retaliate covertly.

Although to our knowledge no studies have focused explicitly on negotiators’ covert retaliation as a function of the negotiation process, such retaliation may be quite prevalent. The two studies here examined covert retaliation in two forms: withholding important resources and creating obstacles for a negotiator. However, as highlighted by research on workplace aggression (Mantell, 1994; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), covert retaliation can take many forms. For example, a negotiator may spread rumors about an opponent in an attempt to damage the opponent’s reputation. In addition, covert forms of retaliation may be especially insidious given that the anger expresser may never know their source. Therefore, negotiators’ covert responses represent a significant negotiation outcome that deserves more research attention.

Being the first to demonstrate the effects of anger expression on negotiators’ covert retaliation, the studies reported here make important contributions to the literature on outcomes of expressed anger in negotiations. First, this paper extends previous work on anger experience in negotiations by focusing on anger expression (Allred et al., 1997). Taking an intrapersonal approach, Allred and colleagues (1997) showed that feelings of anger decreased negotiators’ willingness to work with each other and their ability to achieve joint gains. Extending this work, the present studies took an interpersonal perspective by focusing on how one negotiator’s anger expression influenced the observing negotiator’s value-claiming behavior and retaliatory behaviors. Second, these findings extend the consequences of expressing anger to include outcomes beyond value claiming and beyond the negotiation context (Curhan et al., 2006; Kopelman et al., 2006). While past research has mostly highlighted the explicit and concrete benefits of expressing anger during negotiations (Sinaeur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a), this paper draws attention to the significant hidden costs associated with anger expression. Therefore, the current work complements previous research by offering a broader understanding of the consequences of anger expression in the negotiation process.

The present work also reconciles the apparent theoretical tension associated with the two mechanisms outlined in the Emotion as Social Information (EASI) model (Van Kleef, 2009) by showing that both the inferential and the affective mechanism can influence negotiators’ responses to expressions of anger, albeit in different ways. Through the inferential mechanism, anger expression has an important signaling function in the negotiation process (e.g., Sinaeur & Tiedens, 2006; Van Kleef et al., 2004a). This inferential influence is manifested in the overt channel via negotiators’ more moderate approach to value claiming. Expressions of anger can also affect the emotional state of the other negotiator, for instance by eliciting feelings of mistreatment, as demonstrated in Study 1. Such negative feelings are manifested in the covert channel via negotiators’ hidden retaliatory behavior. Retaliation is likely to occur covertly because negotiators face implicit costs if they retaliate overtly (e.g., risk of impasse, reputation damage, conflict escalation, and physical violence) (Allred, 1999; Kim & Smith, 1993). In addition, the fact that high-power negotiators covertly retaliated against angry opponents even after demanding a lot from them during the negotiation (Study 2) confirms that the inferential and affective mechanisms are distinct, and that the retaliation discovered in these studies was not fuelled by missed opportunities to claim value but by feelings of mistreatment in the negotiation.

The findings reported in this paper also have important practical implications for negotiators interested in managing their anger in the negotiation process. Specifically, consistent with recent research suggesting that anger expression can be a double-edged sword in organizations (Geddes & Callister, 2007; Gibson, Schweitzer, Callister, & Gray, 2009), both the positive and negative outcomes of expressing anger in the negotiation process are highlighted. On the one hand, expressing anger may help a negotiator claim value at the negotiating table. On the other hand, it also increases the other party’s feelings of mistreatment, which can lead to covert forms of retaliation. Therefore, negotiators should take caution when expressing anger in negotiations.

This is not to say that negotiators should always suppress their anger. Indeed, suppressing anger may present its own challenges in the context of negotiation, as suppression has been found to lead to a number of negative outcomes at the individual level (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). Rather, this paper serves as a starting point for examining the potential pitfalls of using anger expression as a tactic to claim value (Barry, 1999; Kopelman et al., 2006). Despite consistent findings that anger expression can be helpful in claiming value (for a review, see Van Kleef et al., 2008), it is important that negotiators be aware of the negative consequences of expressing anger and recognize that expressing anger may not be an ideal strategy for inducing concessions in the negotiation process, unless there are no risks of covert retaliation.

The present studies are not without limitations. Despite great care in ensuring that the actors in both studies maintained consistency in their emotional expressions across negotiations, both studies lacked precise experimental control over how anger was expressed in each negotiation (e.g., its timing and intensity). It is possible that these different dimensions (timing and intensity of anger expression) might themselves have different impact on the effects of anger expression. For example, is there a “tipping” point of intensity before which anger only garners concessions without eliciting retaliation, but after which retaliation is assured (Geddes & Callister, 2007)? In addition, while covert retaliation can take a variety of forms, the two studies here have focused on delivering punishment and withholding benefit. Despite these limitations, however, anger manipulation in the present work, even from two different actors, produced consistent results. Combined, these studies offer strong support for the hidden costs of anger expression.

Future research may also examine the conditions under which the hidden costs of anger expression may be exacerbated or lessened. For example, it would be interesting to explore whether negotiators can distinguish the authenticity of opponents’ expressions of anger and whether they would be more likely to covertly retaliate against opponents whose anger is feigned as a tactical gambit. In addition, while anger expressed in the negotiation process is often interpreted as a protest against an unreasonable offer, anger may also be expressed for other reasons. For example, given research showing that anger is a status-enhancing emotion (Tiedens, 2001), negotiators may also express anger to enhance their status in the negotiation process. It would be interesting to explore whether negotiators can distinguish the different types of anger and whether they would lead to different outcomes. Similarly, given the finding that negotiators strike back because they feel mistreated by an angry opponent, is it possible to express anger in a way that does not lead to negative feelings of mistreatment? For example, a recent study showed that prosocial negotiators rewarded an angry opponent who apologized for the anger (Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010). Will a heartfelt apology following an angry outburst repair the feeling of injustice and thereby prevent the associated hidden costs? Moreover, covert retaliations involved little effort for the participants in both studies. It would be interesting to explore in future research whether participants would still covertly retaliate if they had to pay a small price for the retaliation (e.g., by staying in the lab longer, or by paying back some of the money they earned in the experiment). Lastly, covert
Appendix A. Confederate’s script

Round 1
Actor: Okay. So you are selling phones. Okay, so what I want is 75 for price. I want 7 for the warranty and for the service . . . 8 months. That’s what I want
Round 2
Actor: Really? No. I want 75 for price. 7 months warranty and 7 months service
Round 3
Actor: Okay. How about 75 for price, a 6 months warranty and 7 months service?
Round 4
Actor: No. Are you serious? I want 80 on price, 6 months for warranty and 7 months service
Round 5
Actor: Let’s try this again okay. I want 80 on price. 6 months warranty. 7 months service okay?
Round 6
Actor: C’mon. 85 for price. 6 months for the warranty and 6 months service

Appendix B. Positive and negative tasks

B.1. Short description of Task 1
This task studies positive emotions in the workplace. If you choose to perform this task, you will be induced to feel positive emotions. In particular, you are likely to experience a variety of positive feelings, such as satisfaction, happiness, respect, amusement, and enthusiasm.

B.2. Short description of Task 2
This task studies negative emotions in the workplace. If you choose to perform this task, you will be induced to feel negative emotions. In particular, you are likely to experience a variety of negative feelings, such as frustration, sadness, disrespect, guilt, and shame.

B.3. Short description of Task 3
This task studies investment strategies. In this task, you will be shown several investment tactics that have been proven to be successful. You will be asked to invest the $20 you earned for participating in this experiment using these strategies. Please beware that you may win $10 or lose $1 if you choose to do this task. However, the chance of winning money is much higher than that of losing money. Based on previous research, the odds of winning $10 are 95% and the odds of losing $1 are 5%.

B.4. Short description of Task 4
This task studies the effects of gambling and risky behaviors. You will be asked to gamble with the $20 you earned for participating in this experiment. Please beware that you may win $1 or lose $10 if you choose to do this task. In addition, the chance of losing money is much higher than that of winning money. Based on previous research, the odds of winning $1 are 5% and the odds of losing $10 are 95%.

References
